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Sneed 64. But where the indictment
alleged that the act was done "feloni-
ously, voluntarily and maliciously,"
founded upon a statute that declared
the act must be done "unlawfully and
maliciously," the words used were not
an equivalent, and the indictment was
held bad: Rex v. Turner, R. & l. C.
C.R. 239; 4C.&P. 245; 1Lewin9.
So, the word "feloniously" was held
not the equivalent of "unlawfully and
maliciously :" 2 Russ. Cr. 1066; Rex
v. Turner, 1 Moody C. C. 239 ; Rex v.
Ryan, 2 Id. 15. Where an indictment
charged that the defendant "wilfully
obstructed the public road, &c., con-
trary to the law," it is a sufficient aver-
ument that the act was done unlawfully;
Cappt v. State, 4 Iowa 502. Thewords
"wrongfully and injuriously" are the
equivalent of "unlawfully " in an in-
dictment for maintaining a nuisance in
a highway: State v. Vermont Central
Railroad Co., 1 Williams (Vt.) 103.
"With intent to commit a felony" is
substantially the same as "feloniously:"
Dillard v. State, 3 Heisk. 260. Aver-
ring that the act was done "maliciously
and without any lawful justification" is
the equivalent of the averment that it
was done "unlawfully :" Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 108 Mlass. 463.
"Where a statute makes the doing of
an act "wilfully and maliciously" crim-
inal, it will not be sufficient in the in-
dictment to charge that it was done
"feloniously, unlawfully and wilfully :"
State v. Gove, 34 N. H. 511; nor is
"unlawfully and maliciously" the
equivalent of "wilfully and mali-
ciously:" State v. Hussey, 60 Mle. 410.
So, "feloniously" is not only tanta-
mount to "unlawfully," but is a word
of far more extensive and criminal
meaning: Weinzorpfln v. The State, 7
Blackf. 186; Sloan v. State, 42 Ind.
570; Greer v. State, 50 Id. 267;
Beavers v. State, 58 Id. 530; Shinn v.
State, 68 Id. 420. "Unlawfully and
feloniously" are more than the equiva-
lent of "falsely:" State v. Dark, 8
Blackf. 526. In State v. Murphy, 21
Ind. 441, it is said, "one man cannot
strike another with the malicious and
premeditated intent to murder him-
murder being a technical term-without
so doing unlawfully."
W. W. Tuonxvoe.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
Evidence io Impeach.-In the absence of evidence of fraud, con-
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1881. The cases will probably appear in 14 or 15 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 48 Connecticut Reports
S From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 101 Illinois Reports.
4 From Ihon. Frank McGloin, Reporter; to appear in vol. 1 of his reports.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 13 Rhode Island Reports.
6 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 53 or 54 Wis. Reports.
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spiracy or overreaching of any kind, or anything casting a suspicion
upon the integrity or honesty of the certifying officer,, and when the
certificate of acknowledgment of a deed is in conformity with the
statute, it cannot be impeached by merely negativing the facts therein
stated : ,Strauch v. HMathaway, 101 THl.
As between the former owner of land and an innocent purchaser
under a deed of trust, before the title of the latter can be defeated by
impeaching the truthfulness of the certificate of acknowledgment to the
trust deed, the evidence must be clear and conclusive, excluding every
reasonable doubt: -1d.
AGENT.
Purchase by-Liability of Undisclosed TPin pal.-Where goods are
sold to a person who is in fact an agent of another, and on his credit,"
but without knowledge of the agency on the part of the seller, the
latter has the right to elect to make the principal his debtor on dis-
coverinl him : errill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn.
And the same principle applies where the seller is informed at the
time of the sale that the buyer is an agent, but is not informed who
the principal is: Id.
And where the seller takes the promissory note of the buyer for the
goods, with knowledge that he is an agent, but without knowledge who
is the principal, he is not debarred thereby from electing to make the
principal his debtor: Id.
ARBITRATION.
Provision for in Contract-Efect of- Waiver.-Where parties defi-
nitely agree in their contract to submit all differences which may arise
thereunder to arbitration, this stipulation is binding, and either party
appealing to the courts, before submitting to or.tendering arbitration,
will be dismissed: Alford v. Tiblier, 1 MeGloin.
Such a defence, however, is waived where the party sued appears
and presents his defences, without specially pleading this objection : Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Acceptance- Obligation. of Accetor.-A party accepting a com-
mercial draft or bill of exchange guarantees the right of the drawer to
execute it, and the genuineness of the signature. In innocent hands,
this guarantee extends to the question of an agent's authority where
the draft is drawn by procuration. It does not, however, operate to
protept the person who originally receives the- paper and is so charge-
able with the obligation of making due inquiry: Agnel v. Ellis,
1 lIcGloin.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Adopted Child-Right of Inheritance.-The rights of inheritance
acquired by an adopted child under the laws of another state, where he
was adopted, will be recognised and upheld in this state only so far as
they -be not inconsistent with our laws of descent, so that if such child
cannot take by descent by our statute, it cannot take at all, no matter
what may be the law of "the state where the adoption was made
.Keegan v. Geraghty, '101 Ill,
As against an adopted child, the statute should be strictly construed
.198
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as being in derogation of the general law of inheritance, which is
founded on natural relationship, and is a rule of succession according
to nature, which has prevailed from time immemorial: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Intoxicating Liuors-Statutory Provision as to Proof of Sale.-
Pub. Laws R. I., cap. 797, sect. 4, of Iarch 18th 1880, provides: "It
shall not be necessary to prove an actual sale of the liquors enumerated
in sects. 18 and 19 of said chapter 508, in any building, shop, saloon,
place or tenement, in order to establish the fact that any of said liquors
are there kept for sale; but the notorious character of any such
premises, or the notoriously bad or intemperate character of persons
frequenting the same, or the keeping of the implements or appurte-
nances usually appertaining to grog-shops, tippling-shops, or places
where such liquors aie sold, shall be prima facie evidence that said
liquors are kept on such premises for the purposes of sale within this
state." Held, unconstitutional, in depriving the accused of the pro-
tection of the common-law principle that every person is to be pre-
sumed innocent until he is proved guilty, and in violating the provision
that an accused shall not "be deprived of life, liberty or property,
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land ;" State v.
Beswick, 13 R. I.
CONTRACT.
Failure of onsideration.-A. sold certain goods to B., taking in
payment the standing wood on a farm held by B. Of this standing
wood, the amount brought to market by A. only paid the outlay made
for cutting and hauling, and the trade with B. was made pending equity
proceedings, which involved the title to the farm, and which resulted
adversely to B. ifeld, that there was a total failure of consideration
for the goods sold by A. to B. Held, further, that A. could maintain
assumpsit against B. for the value of these goods: Peckham v. Kiernan,
13 R. I.
Purchase of Stock on Margin-Evidence of meaning of" Margin"-
Wagering Contract- Usury.-The defendant wrote the plaintifi', who
were stockbrokers in the city of New York-" I want to buy say one
hundred shares Union Pacific stock on margin. You will take $1000
first morgage N. York & Oswego R. R. and do it ?" The plaintiffs
replied that they would, and at once bought the stock, and soon after
sold it by the defendant's order ata profit. Other stocks were after-
wards bought and sold by the plaintiffs for the defendant under the
same arrangement, resulting in a final loss, exceeding the value of the
security held, and the plaintiffs sued for the balance. Reld, 1. That
evidence was admissible on the part of the plaintiffs to show the mean-
ing of the words "on margin," that term being used by stockbrokers
and having acquired a special and well understood meaning in their
business 2. That the contract not being one for the mere payment of
differences, but the defendant having, through the plaintiffs as his
agents, actually purchased the stock, which was delivered to them, and
which they were ready to transfer to him on payment of the purchase-
money, it was not a gaming contract: Batch v. Douglas, 48 Conn.
The custom of stockbrokers to debit and- credit interest monthly,
200 ABSTRACTS-OF RECENT -DECISIONS.
computing interest on balances, does not necessarily involve usury, as:
the balances may be paid. But if the taking of such interest would be
usury, it is only a question of the allowance of it by the court, and
does not affect the contract for the purchase and sale of the stocks, as
it is wholly outside of it: .d.
Stipulation for Particular Measa rement.-A clause in a contract of
sale, that the measurement shall be by a person named, is obligatory, in
default of fraud or error alleged, such as would justify rescission - Dan-
ncr v. Otis, 1 McGloin.
A simple averment in the answer to a suit upon such a written con-
tract that the measurement is not correct, according to a particular rule
or method not specified in the agreement, will not warrant the introduc-
tion of evidence to contradict, annul or amplify the contract: Id.
CORPORATION.
Transfers of Stock- Failure to Record-Attachment.-B., owning
certain corporate shares, transferred them on the books of the cor-
poration as collateral security to G. The arrangements between B.
and G. being ended, G., at B.'s request, endorsed and transferred
the certificate of the stock to D., a creditor of B. Before any
transfer had been made on the books of-the corporation from G. to D.
the stock was attached as the property of B. by B.'s creditors. The
charter of the corporation contained no provision as to the transfer of
stock, but the by-laws provided that " all transfers of stock-shall be
made in the books of the company." On a bill in equity brought to
establish the lien of the attachment, held, that in the absence of a
fraudulent intent on the part of B. in the transfer of the stock the
attachment could not be sustained. .Held, further, that at the time of
the attachment B. had neither the legal title to the stock which was in
G., nor the equitable title which was in D. : Beckwith v. Burrough,
13 R. I.
COVENANT.
What amounts to.-Neither express words of covenant nor any par-
ticular words, nor any special form of words are necessary in order to
charge a party with covenant. Sometimes words of proviso and con-
dition, or even recitals, will be construed into words of covenant, such
being the apparent intention and meaning of the parties: Hale v. Finch,
S. C. U. S.,'Oct. Term 1881.
Covenant will not arise unless it can be collected from the whole
instrument that there was an agreement or promise or engagement upon
the part of the person saughAt to be charged for the performance or non-
performance of some act: Id.
CRIMINAL LAw.
New Trial-For Newly-Discovered Evidence.-A new trial will not
be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, where it does
not appear but the evidence might have been had on the trial by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, nor where such evidence is in its
nature impeaching only: Tobin v. People, 101 IlH.
New Trial-After-Discovered Evidence.-The rules with regard to
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petitions for new trials for newly-discovered evidence in civil cases, apply
to such petitions in criminal cases: Ramlia v. The State, 48 Conn.
And they apply equally to capital cases; although as an error here
would be remediless, the court will be more inclined to give the
petitioner the benefit of any doubt that may be raised in their minds
by the new evidence; Id.
It is one of these rules that the evidence must be sufficient to change
the rbsult if a new trial should be had: Id.
DAMAGES.
Negligence- Value of use of Animal Injured.-In an action for an
injury to plaintiff's mare, from which she died, and which is alleged to
have been caused by a defective highway, it was error to admit evi-
dence of the value of the use of the animal during the period which
intervened between the injury and the death, " including plaintiff's ser-
vices in taking care of her :" Page v. Town of Sunpter, 53 or 54 Wis.
Where the verdict in such a case necessarily includes the value of
the animal at the time of the injury, and also a considerable, sum for
the loss of her use after the injury, the damages will be regarded as
excessive : Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife.
Conlract for Constrzwtion of Chattel-Pament-Agreement that Title
shall vest in Buyer.-Whre one contracts with another for a chattel
not in existence, but to be made for him, though he pays the whole
price in advance or from time to time as the work progresses, he
acquires no title in the chattel until it is finished and delivered to him,
unless a contrary intent is expressed : Shaw v. Smith, 48 Conn.
And where the parties agree that the title shall at once vest in the
buyer, so that the sale is complete as between the parties, yet the
retention of possession by the maker leaves the chattel open to attach-
ment by the creditors of the latter : Id.
Sale of Property nbt yet in Existence- Change of Possession.-By a
contract between A. and B., all the colts thereafter foaled by certain
mares sold by B. to A., and kept in B.'s stables under A.'s care were to
belong to A. Reld, 1. That a valid sale could be made of the colts
before they were foaled. 2. That the question of retention of possession
by B. could not apply to them, as they were not in existence when the
mares were sold to A. and the contract made. 3. That it was not im-
portant, upon a question between A. and the creditors of B. as to the
title to the colts, whether there had been a legal and visible change of
possession as to the mares : -ull v. Hull, 48 Conn.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. See Will.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Highways-Streets- Use for Railroad Purposes-Extent of use
Granted.-A grant of power to a railroad company to construct its road
upon or across a road or highway which the route of its road may
intersect, the corporation to restore the road or highway to its former
state, or in a sufficient manner not to impair its usefulness, is equivalent
to allowing a joint use of the highway by the company with the public,
VOL. XXX.-26
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protecting its uses as an ordinary highway against any impairment. It
does not authorize a use to the exclusion of ordinary travel thereon
P., Ft. W. & C. Railroad Co. v. Reich, 101 Ill.
EQUITY. See WILL.
Remedy to compel Tssue of Coporate Bonds.-A court of chancery
has no jurisdiction to entertain a bill to compel the corporate authorities
of a town to issue and deliver its bonds in pursuance of a vote to aid in
the construction of a railroad. The proper remedy is by mandamus.
Such court has not the power to compel the performance of contracts
for the payment of money or to give notes or bonds: The Chicago, D.
& V. Railroad Co. v. Town of St. Anne, 101 Ill.
Action to Remove Cloud upon Title-By whom lfaintainable-
Parties.-Where the facts which render an assessment upon land
invalid, are not matter of record, an action to prevent a cloud upon the
title, by setting aside the assessment, may be maintained either by the
present owner of the land in possession, or by one who has conveyed
it by warranty deed with full. covenants: Pier v. Fond du Lac Co.,
53 or 54 Wis.
In such an action by the grantor, the grantee, though a proper is not
a necessary party, especially where parcels of the land have been
granted to many persons severally : Id.
EVIDENCE.
Officer's Return.-An officer's return is evidence of the facts stated
in it only so far as the return is responsive to the writ: Parker v.
Palmer, 13 R. I.
Hence, when to a writ of replevin an officer made return that he
found the goods in the town of H. Held, that the return was not
evidence that the goods were found in the town of H.: Id.
Parol Evidence to add to Written Contrat.-Where a contract is
reduced to writing, which purports to contain the whole contract, and
it is not apparent from the writing itself that anything is left out to be
supplied by extrinsic evidence, parol evidence to vary or add to its
terms is not admissible: Heil v. Beller, 53 or 54 Wis.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
Judgment-Not bindinzg on Strangers to the Action.-One not a
party to an action, nor notified of its pendency, having no opportunity
or right to control the defence, to introduce or cross-examine witnesses,
or to prosecute a writ of error from the judgment therein, is not bound
by such judgment: Hale v. Finch, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Guaranty of Note given for Guarantor's Debt.-Where a debtor
induces his creditor to take in settlement of *the indebtedness the note
of a third person, with such debtor's guaranty of its palyment, not stating
the consideration, this is in effect a promise by such debtor to pay his
own debt in a particular manner, and is not within the Statute of Frauds:
Eagle M. & R. Machine Co. v. Shattuck, 53 or 54 Wis.
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GUARDIAN AND WrARD.
Lease of Wards' Land without aproval by .Probate Court- Validity
of.-A lease of property by a widow in her own right, and as guardian
for her minor children, cannot be avoided by the lessee for want of its
approval by the ]Probate Court. A lease executed by a guardian in
behalf of his wards for a term not exceeding their majority is valid,
unless disapproved by the Probate Court. The approval of that court
is not essential to the validity of the lease: Field v. Merick, 101 Ill.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Divorce- Opening of Decree.-A decree of divorce is subject to the
order of the court during the term at which it is entered, and may on
proper application and for good reasons be reopened and reheard during
such term: Mumford v. Afumford, 13 R. I.
Such a decree will not be reopened at the request of a respondent
whose conduct during the proceedings has shown a wish to cause delay,
and who has been guilty of false pleading: Id.
Conveyance by liusband to Wife-Bona fides-Burden of Proof.-
In an action between a wife and her husband's creditors, where she
claims property in dispute by purchase from her husband, the burden
is upon her to prove, by clear and satisfactory evidence, that such pur-
chase was made in good faith, for a valuable consideration paid out of
her separate estate, or by a third person for her; and the same rule
applies to one who took from the wife with notice: Horton v. Dewey,
53 or 54 Wis.
In such a case, a mere recital of a valuable consideration, in the bill
of sale from husband to wife, will not support a verdict in her favor: Id.
INSURANCE.
Mutual Corniany-.Assessment-Pleading.-A certificate of member-
ship in a mutual life insurance company provided that, on the death of
the wife of the plaintiff, an assessment should be made upon the policy-
holders in the company for as many dollars as there were policy-holders,
and that the sum collected, not exceeding one thousand dollars, should
be paid to him within ninety days from the filing of the proof of death.
Held, that a declaration containing no allegation of a neglect to make
the assessment provided for, and assigning no breach except of a promise
to pay one thousand dollars was fatally defective, and that the defect
was not cured by the verdict: Curtis v. The Mutual Benefit Jife Co.,
48 Conn.
JUDGMENT. See Former Adjudication.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Prior Tenant holding Over-Rights of Subseguent Lessee.-A lessee
cannot have his lease set aside and be released from his covenants to
pay rent from the mere fact that a prior tenant, whose term has expired,
holds over without right. The lessee, having the right of possession,
should take legal steps to obtain possession against such prior tenant:
Field v. Herrick, 101 Ill.
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LIITATIONs, STATUTE O.
What Promise will ake Case out of -A debtor, whose debt was
barred by the Statute of Limitations, said to his creditor with regard
to it, "1 will pay it as soon as possible." Held, to be a sufficient ae-
knowledgient of the debt to take it out of the statute: Norton v.
Shepard, 48 Conn.
As a general rule any language of the debtor to the creditor clearly
admitting the debt; and showing an intention to pay it, will be con-
sidered an implied promise to pay and will take the case out of the
statute : id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Contract to give Notice-Forfeiture- Temporar / Absence.-An opera-
tive in the mill of the Flax Manufacturing Co. had agreed in writing
to give "two weeks' notice of his desire to quit the service of said
company at any time, or in default of said two weeks' notice to forfeit
two weeks pay." Held, that the agreement did not apply to a temporary
absence; that in case of a temporary absence without leave the opera-
tive might properly be discharged, but that there would be no forfeiture
under the agreement of wages then earned: Heber v. The laz J1an.
Co., 13 R. I.
MINES.
Re-location-Annual Work-.Entr2 ,-Acts of Congress.-Where the
original locators of a mining claim who have neglected to perform the
annual work required by the Act of May 10th 1872, 17 stat. 91, ch.
152, resume such work before a relocation by other parties, such resump-
tion will continue their claim until the end of the year in which the
work was resumed. The Act of June 6th 1874, 18 stat. 61, ch. 2'20,
makes no change in this respect: Belk v. Meagher, S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term 1881.
A re-location by other parties during the year in which work is
resumed gives the new parties no right to the possession even though
they remain in possession after the expiration of such year: Id.
In such case the original owners by a peaceable entry on their claim
may secure a good right which will enable them to hold the claim as
against such other parties: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Description of Debt-Parol Proof.-If in a mortgage the total
amount of indebtedness secured is stated it is not necessary to specify
the items of such indebtedness. If there has been no fraud, and sub-
sequent creditors have not been injured by the omission of such specifi-
cation, the identity of the debt may be established by parol. In making
the proof, the debt must come fairly within the general description
which has been given, but if it does, and the identity is satisfactorily
made out, the mortgage will be sustained: Wood v. Wei-mer, S. C. U. S.,
'Oct. Term 1881.
MUNICIPAL BONDS. See Equity.
NATIONAL BANK.
U'sury-Purchase of Business Paper.-The fact that by the law of
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the state in which a national bank is situated, the purchase of business
paper from the payee, at a greater rate of discount than the legal inter-
est, is not usurious, will not relieve the bank, in case it discounts such
paper for the payee at a rate in excess of the legal interest, from the
penalty imposed by sect. 5198, Rev. Stat.: Nat. Bank of Gloversville
v. Johnson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
NEGL rNCE. See Railroad.
OFFICER. See Records.
PARENT AND CHILD. See Conflict of Laws.
Meaning of word "Child"- Grandchildren.-The by-laws of a
benevolent association provided that on the death of a member a sum
of money should be paid "to the widow of such member, if there be
one; if he leaves no widow, theh to the child or children, or their
lawful guardian for them, share and share alike. Should the deceased
member leave no widow, child or children, the money shall be paid to
such person as he may have designated in writing." Held, that the
words " child or children" must be taken in their primary meaning,
and could not be extended to include grandchildren: Winsor v. Odd
Fellows' Beneficial Association, 13 R. 1.
PATENT.
Public Use- What Constitutes.-To constitute a public use of an
invention it is not necessary that more than one of the invented articles
should be used, or that such use should be by more than one person.
And if the inventor permits such use without restriction, it is a public
use, notwithstanding that by the very character of the invention it is
only capable of being used where it cannot be seen by the public eye:
Egbert v. Lippman, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
PAYMENT.
Made under .Mistake of Fact recoverable back.-Where a person
buying milk pays for the same, counting each can as containing eight
gallons, supposing the cans to hold that much, when in fact they do not,
he may set off the money paid by him for the shortage out of any sum
he may owe the seller, in a suit for its price: Devine v. Edwards,
101 Ill.
RAILROAD.
_hegligence-Persons walking on Track.-A railroad company is
Pound to provide for a careful lookout in the direction in which a train
is moving, in places where people, and especially where children, are
likely to be upon the track: Townley v. C., M. & St. P. Railroad,
53 or 54 Wis.
Although the statute (sect. 1811, R. S.) makes it unlawful for a per-
son not connected with or employed upon a railroad, to walk along the
track thereof, "except when the same shall be laid along public roads
or streets," yet where the question is whether a person injured while
walking upon a railroad track was guilty of a want of ordinary care, it
is error to reject evidence showing that many persons, men, women and
children, had, for years before the accident in question, been in the
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habit of passing, daily and hourly, up and down in the same pathway
on which the injured person was passing-since such evidence would
tend to show a license, or to repel the inference of a want of ordinary
care, and also to show a lack of such care on defendant's part as the
facts required : -d.
Grant of Land-Location.-In all grants which are to be satisfied
out of sections along the line of a road, it is necessarily implied, in the
absence of specific designation otherwise, that the land is to be taken
from the nearest undisposed sections of the character mentioned.
Such grants give no license to the grantees to roam over the whole
public domain lying on either side of the road in search of land,
desired. The grants must be satisfied out of the first land found which
meets the conditions named: Wood v. Burlington & 111o. River Rail-
road Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
RECEIVER.
Foreign Cw~poraton.-A foreign corporation is for purposes of ju-
risdiction a "resident" of the state which creates it, and under the laws
of Rhode Island the courts of that state have no power to appoint a
receiver of the estate of a foreign corporation doing business within the
state: Stafford v. American .Mills Co., 13 R. L
RECORDS.
Books of Public Officer-Dedication to Public use.-The books
which the recorder of mortgages for the parish of Orleans has pur-
chased and placed in his office to be used for making the inscriptions
authorized and required by law, and which have been partially filled,
have been, by such use, dedicated to the public service, and they are
no longer susceptible of private ownership: Herron v. .AtcEery, 1
ANeGloin.
The researches or memoranda of mortgages existing against certain
persons, which have been made by the clerks of the recorders, and
which are used in facilitating the preparation of tificates of mort-
gages, are archives of the mortgage office, and not the private property
of the recorders : Id.
SALE. See Debtor and Creditor.
Conditional Sale-'What is-Breach of Condition-S'uit for Pur-
chase-money.-The defendant received of the plaintiff an organ, and
signed and delivered to him the following agreement prepared by the
plaintiff: "The subscriber has, this 21st day of December 1877, rented
of H. (the plaintiff) one choral organ, during the payment of rent as
herein agreed, for the full rent of $190, payable as follows : one melo-'
deon valued at $50, as first payment, and one note for $140, due Janu-
ary 15th 1879 ; with the understanding that if I shall have punctually
paid all said rent I shall be entitled to a bill of sale of the organ, and if
I fail to pay any of said rent when due, all my rights herein shall
terminate, and said Hl. may take possession of said organ." Held, not
to be a lease of the organ, but a conditional sale, and that the plaintiff
could not recover upon the $140 note after the organ had been returned
Rine v. Roberts, 48 Conn.
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The consideration of the note was not the mere right to pay for and
receive title to the organ, but the actual purchase and the acquisition
of title as an accomplished fact. When, therefore, the purchase failed
there was a complete failure of consideration : Id.
SHERIFF.
Seizure of Pr.operty-Liability of Sheri .- Sheriffs, under writs
directing, in general terms, the seizure of a debtor's property, must, at
their peril, primarily determine whether the property to be seized
b.elongs to the defendant or not: Clavarie v. Waggaman, 1 McGloih.
Under writs commanding the seizure of specific property, the sheriffs,
ordinarily, have no discretion and incur no responsibility, being held only
to look to the jurisdiction of the court, and to the proper execution of its
mandates: Id.
Cannot Arrest out of the County-Duties of.-The sheriff of one
county cannot make an arrest in another county except on fresh pursuit
in case of an escape, nor can he detain in such other county an arrested
prisoner, except under a writ of habeas corpus: Page v. Staples,
13 R. I.
A sheriff is not obliged to travel about with an arrested prisoner to
enable the latter to nrocure bail: Id.
STATUTE.
Repeal-Effect on Right of Action under.-Where, during the ex-
istence of a statute which made it unlawful for a railroad company to
charge for the carriage of freight higher rates than those prescribed in
the act, plaintiff was compelled by the defendant railway company to
pay higher rates, and paid them under protest, the subsequent repeal
of the statute will not prevent his recovering damages for defendant's
unlawful act: Graham v. C. M. & St. Paul Railroad Co.;53 or 54 Wis.
TAXATION.
Assessment-Constitutional Law.-The taxing power belongs to the
legislative departmetit, and it is entirely within the province of that
department to determine the rules of assessment of property and for the
collection of taxes : State v. Board of Assessors, 1 M Gloin.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
Jurisdiction- Collusive Transfer to bring Suit in United States
Court.-Where in a federal court the evidence shows that there had
been a collusive transfer to a citizen of another state in order to giv3
jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court on its own motion to stop the
proceedings and dismiss the suit: Williams v. Township of Nottawa,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
UsuRY. See Contract; Nrational Bank.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Right to Alley.-Where parties purchase from a common vendor,
who has laid out in the rear an alley common to them all, but by their
titles their lots run back only to such alley, they receive no right,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
except that of use to the land taken up thereby: Bourace v. Pei'ry, 1
McGloin.
Vendor's Lien-Advances of Money to Vendee by a Stranger.-A.
purchased one hundred and twenty acres of land, for the benefit of B.,
and paid the purchase-money, and had the deeds made to B. The deed
was left with A., and, upon B.'s paying back to A. part of the consider-
ation money, and giving A. his notes for the remainder, the deed was
delivered to B., and he went into possession of the land. Held, that,
in the view of equity, A. and B. stood in the relation of vendor and
purchaser of the land, and the former -had a vendor's lien for the
amount of the unpaid notes: Carey v. Boyle, 53 or 54 Wis.
Even if A. is to be regarded as a stranger to the title, who merely
advanced money to B. for the sole purpose (as understood by both) of
enabling the latter to purchase the land, he is entitled, by the law of
this state, to be subrogated to the rights of the vendor: Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
Riparian Proprietor-Own ershTip of Bed of Stream-lRight to
Ice.-A stream above the tide, although it may be navigable in fact,
belongs to the riparian proprietor on each side of it to its centre thread,
and the only right the public has therein is an easement for the pur-
pose of navigation: Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill.
The use of the water which belongs to the riparian proprietor, in
case of its being congealed into ice, would give him the unlimited use
of the ice as his exclusive property, and any stranger who enters upon
the same and appropriates the ice will be liable in trespass guare
clausumnfregit: Id.
WILL.
Undue Influence as to Single Legacy.-Fraud or undue influence in
procuring one legacy in a will does not invalidate other legacies not so
procured: Harrison's Appeal, 48 Conn.
Where the issue is as to the fact of undue influence in procuring a
will, and it appears that the undue influence was confined to a single
legacy in the will, the jury may find under that- issue the will void as
to that legacy and valid as to the others : Id.
Probate- Conveyance by Executor--Subsequent Discovery of Later
Will-Application of Purchase-money to Mortgage of Decedent-Bill
to set aside Conveyance without Repayment of lPurchase.mo ey.-A
sale of land duly made by order of a probate court having jurisdiction,
and a conveyance thereof by the executor of a will duly admitted to
probate, while his functions are in full force, to a bona fide purchaser
for value, vests in such purchaser a good and valid title which is not
affected by the discovery of a later will and its admission to probate and
record: Davis v. Gaines, S. C. U. S.; Oct.. Term 1881.
When the purchase-money, paid by a purchaSer in good faith, of real
estate of a decedent ordered to be sold by a probate court, has been
applied to the extinguishment of a mortgage executed by the decedent
upon the property sold, and constituting a valid encumbrance thereon,
and it turns out that rhe sale is irregular or void, the purchaser cannot
be ousted of his possession, upon a bill in equity filed by the heir or
devisee, without a repayment or tender of the purchase-money so paid
and applied: Id.
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